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Abstract
The integration of emotion and cognition in cognitive
architectures for embodied agents is a problem of in-
creasing importance. In this paper, we describe how two
separate modules for these tasks, as we employ them in
our virtual human Max, can influence each other in such
an architecture. In the first direction, from cognition to
emotion, we present domain-specific as well as more gen-
eral appraisal mechanisms, as employed in three differ-
ent interaction scenarios. For domain-independent ap-
praisal the belief-desire-intention model is exploited to
derive emotional impulses during the decision process.
In the opposite direction, we discuss how emotions can
influence cognition either as self-beliefs or as modulators
to the decision-making process itself. For the latter, ex-
tensions to the BDI-interpreter are proposed.
Introduction and Motivation
With the growing interest in socially intelligent agents,
the integration of simulated emotions into an agent’s cog-
nitive architecture becomes increasingly important. The
resultant architecture may comprise dedicated modules
for deliberative reasoning as well as emotions, or a more
integrated approach can be taken, deriving and manag-
ing emotions within the deliberative module itself. In
any case, the interplay of cognitive and emotional pro-
cesses takes place via two main kinds of mechanisms.
The first is appraisal, the evaluation of sensory or cogni-
tive events for their impact on the emotions of the agent.
The second is concerned with the influences of emotions
on the agent’s deliberative module, and is much harder
to be treated in similarly clear-cut ways.
In this paper, we present our work toward the integra-
tion of cognitive and emotional processes in the architec-
ture of the virtual human Max. Max’s internal modu-
lar structure has been built up, tested, and extended in
a row of different scenarios, including a collaborator in
Virtual Reality assembly tasks [9], an empathic oppo-
nent in a cards game [4], or a conversational museum
guide in a public computer museum [8]. Across these
scenarios with their different characteristics and require-
ments, we have addressed the question how the thoughts
and feelings of Max can be interconnected in increasingly
comprehensive models, and how this can be utilized for
more believable behavior in the respective domains.
In the next section, we will start with an overview of
related work along the lines of two major emotion re-
search trends in psychology. In Section 3, we introduce
our virtual agent’s modular architecture along with an
outline of the three main interaction scenarios. In Sec-
tion 4, we introduce a system for simulating the agent’s
emotions and present different solutions for how it can
be driven by the agent’s cognitive processes. More pre-
cisely, we will describe implementations and results of
domain-specific appraisal, as exemplified and applied in
the three task-oriented interaction scenarios, as well as
more general mechanisms of how the influence of goal-
directed deliberation on emotions can be modeled. Sec-
tion 5 addresses the opposite direction of influencing,
namely, how the effect of emotions on cognitive processes
can be modeled for embodied agents. We will differenti-
ate between emotions that are fed back into cognition as
a form of belief about oneself and the role of emotions
as modulators of the overall deliberative processing.
Related Work
We start with discussing the approaches that have been
taken to simulate emotions for artificial agents, and how
they interact with the agent’s cognitive reasoning pro-
cesses. According to [1] at least two main viewpoints can
be distinguished in modeling emotions: cognitive theo-
ries of emotions and dimensional theories of emotions.
One cognitive theory has become the standard model
for emotion synthesis and is commonly known as the
OCC [16] model of emotions. It was carefully designed
as a computational model of emotions and builds upon
the assumption that 22 discrete emotion categories can
be derived as valenced reactions to situational contexts,
based on deliberative reasoning. Appraisal is the ba-
sis of every computational emotion theory, but in the
OCC model it is indistinguishably intertwined with the
cognitive processing of an agent. This approach is con-
ceptually close to the methodologies applied in symbolic
A.I., and it has been frequently applied to integrate emo-
tions into agent architectures, e.g. [20]. Despite its com-
prehensiveness and explanatory power, this model was
frequently criticized, e.g., for not taking into account
the mutual interaction of emotion categories and for not
keeping track of their development in time. Many im-
plementations have tried to circumvent these drawbacks
(e.g. [7], [19]), but these attempts have only been mod-
erately successful. Ortony himself [15] has proposed that
it might be sufficient to integrate only ten emotion cate-
gories into an agent’s architecture, five positive and five
negative ones. He also argued that it might be adequate
to start with an agent that can only differentiate positive
from negative, letting it evolve richer emotional experi-
ence by means of machine learning techniques. To our
knowledge, no one has followed this idea consequently in
an implemented system.
Initially Wundt [22] has claimed that any emotion can
be characterized as a continuous progression in a three-
dimensional space of connotative meaning. Several re-
searchers (e.g. [13]) have provided statistical evidence
for this assumption. Using principle component anal-
ysis they found that three dimensions are sufficient to
represent the connotative meaning of emotional cate-
gories. These dimensions are commonly labeled Plea-
sure/Valence (P), representing the overall valence infor-
mation, Arousal (A), accounting for the degree of active-
ness of an emotion, and Dominance/Power (D), describ-
ing the experienced “control” over the emotion itself or
the situational context it originated from (PAD-space, in
short). For emotion recognition, this space is often re-
duced to the first two dimensions Pleasure/Valence and
Arousal (A) [10]. For example, Prendinger et al. [17]
derive the human’s emotional state from physiological
data, assuming that skin conductance is positively cor-
related with arousal and that muscle tension is an indi-
cator of negative valence. The derived values are then
classified in the two dimensional emotion space accord-
ing to [10]. The restriction to two dimensions is mainly
due to the fact that Dominance can not be derived from
such sensor data, as it depends on an actor’s subjective
feeling of control over a situation. Embodied agents, in
contrast, are embedded in a (virtual or physical) situ-
ational context, therefore enabling them to derive this
sense of control analytically. The emotion system of the
sociable robot “Kismet” [5], for example, is based on a
three-dimensional emotion space similar to the one ex-
plained above.
The Virtual Human Max
The virtual human Max, under development at Bielefeld
University’s A.I. group, is a testbed for studying and
modeling human-like communicative behavior in natu-
ral face-to-face interactions [9]. We started out from the
idea of having an anthropomorphic agent as the embod-
iment of the artificial intelligence to interact with, and
of using its simulated physis to provide a bodily ground-
ing in situational context. In interactions, Max should
be able to use the modalities of speech, gestures, facial
expressions, gaze, or posture in combination, as humans
do when communicating with each other. To this end,
we equipped the agent with a physis and provided him
with the motor capabilities needed for synthesizing non-
verbal communicative behavior. The skeleton provides
human-like maneuverability and delivers simulated pro-
prioceptive feedback about the current body posture or
motion; 21 simulated face muscles allow for animation of
lip-sync speech and a variety of facial expressions.
Max internal architecture consists of a reactive mod-
ule, a cognition module, and an emotion module ([11]).
The reactive module is generally in charge of realizing all
behaviors that are requested by the other components.
On the one hand, this includes feedback-driven reactive
behaviors like tracking the current interlocutor by gaze
based on incoming positioning events. Other behaviors
concern the agent’s secondary behaviors like eye blink
and breathing. On the other hand, the reactive mod-
ule accomplishes behavior generation for all intentional
actions Max is to make, in particular his multimodal
utterances.
The cognitive module builds on the belief-desire-
intention model (BDI, in short) of rational behavior,
i.e. it incessantly pursues multiple plans (intentions) to
achieve persistent goals (desires) in the context of up-
to-date knowledge about the world (beliefs). Desires,
which are differentiated from instantiated subgoals, can
emerge from internal processing but also through inter-
actions with the environment or the human interlocu-
tor. Intended courses of action are represented as plans
with preconditions, context conditions, effects, and a
utility function. The BDI-interpreter continually pur-
sues the plan with the highest utility value as an in-
tention. Plans in execution can either directly trigger
specific behaviors and motor programs to act, but may
also invoke other self-contained planners that construct
context-dependent plans. Thus, complex plans can be
expanded on demand by instantiating lower-level plans.
The emotion module of Max’s architecture fol-
lows the simulation-based approach. In contrast to
communication-driven approaches where expressions of
emotions are deliberatively used as a means of commu-
nication, we focus on a simulation that allows for a co-
herent evolvement of emotions over time. Two major as-
sumptions underly our realization, as supported by psy-
chology literature (e.g. see [14]):
1. Every elicited emotion has a fortifying or alleviating
effect on the mood of an individual. An emotion can
usually be associated with its eliciting stimulus and
is a short-lived psychological phenomenon. A mood,
in contrast, is a more diffuse and longer lasting, va-
lenced state. The predisposition to experience emo-
tions changes together with the mood, e.g. humans in
a positive mood are thought to be more susceptible to
positive than negative emotions, and vice versa.
2. Every basic emotion category can be positioned in the
emotion space introduced above and a distance met-
ric can be applied to map the dynamically simulated
emotional state onto one of these categories.
Based on these two assumptions, we implemented an
emotion dynamics simulation system that runs concur-
rently with the BDI module and processes valenced im-
pulses together with the actual degree of dominance as
input signals. These signals are driving the internal dy-
namics of a dimensional emotion representation by, first,
changing the emotional valence, secondly, influencing the
agent’s mood and finally mapping these values into the
PAD-space (see Figure 1) for classifying the emotion (see
[3] for details). The emotion system provides the agent’s
overall architecture with the currently active categori-
cal emotion, the actual level of pleasure and arousal,
and the actual mood value. At the physis of the agent,
the values of pleasure and arousal are directly expressed
through his body (rates of breathing and eye blink) and
his prosody (pitch and speech rate of the voice). Like-
wise, the agent’s facial expressions are directly driven by
the emotion categories based on [6] (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: The ten emotion categories in PAD-space to-
gether with the seven attributed facial expressions
We investigated the interplay of the reactive, deliber-
ative, and emotion modules, including the mutual influ-
ence of cognition and emotion as described in the follow-
ing sections, in the context of three interaction scenarios:
Museum Guide Scenario In the first scenario our
agent Max is employed as a conversational guide in a
public computer museum [8]. By means of a video cam-
era Max can perceive the presence of museum visitors,
and he engages them in conversations in which he pro-
vides information about the museum, the exhibition, and
other topics. The visitors can talk to Max by entering
text input via a keyboard in front of the agent.
Cards Game Scenario We implemented a cards
game called ”Skip-Bo” as a face-to-face interaction sce-
nario between a human player and Max [4]. In this game,
both players have the goal of getting rid of their cards
either following an offensive or defensive strategy. In
such a playful interaction, we were interested in the ef-
fect that affective and/or empathic agent behavior has
on human players. To let Max show positive or negative
empathy, we measured physiological indicators for the
emotions of the human players, e.g. their skin conduc-
tance. By evaluating this data as well as results from a
questionnaire we could analyze for the observer’s emo-
tional experience, solely depending on Max’s emotional
appraisal and display.
Assembly Scenario Finally, Max has been employed
in a collaborative assembly task, where he meets a hu-
man face-to-face in a VR environment [9]. Combining
deliberative and reactive conversational behaviors with
the capability to initiate assembly actions, the agent
guides the interlocutor through interactive construction
procedures. In our current work, emotions are associated
with goal achievement or failure.
How Cognition Influences Emotions
Two main approaches can be differentiated in model-
ing how emotional effects arise out of cognitive pro-
cesses, domain-specific and domain-independent emo-
tion simulation. As Gratch and Marsella [7] point out,
in domain-specific emotion simulations researchers use
task-oriented algorithms to implement appraisal routines
specifically designed for the current task of the agent.
Fewer approaches are domain-independent in that they
bring emotional appraisal to a conceptually higher level,
thereby not relying on special aspects of the agent’s con-
crete task. In the modeling of our system, we have ap-
plied and combined both ways.
Domain-specific Emotion Simulation
Within fixed domains, one way to let emotions originate
from cognition pertains to cognitively appraising incom-
ing events and then sending appropriate impulses to the
emotion system. We have followed and tested this ap-
proach in two different scenarios.
In the museum guide scenario Max uses a rule-based
analysis of the typed input to respond multimodally by
means of synthesized gestures and voice. Part of this is
an appraisal of incoming events, such that Max is emo-
tionally influenced by insults or praising remarks by a
human interactant. This appraisal has been scripted as
domain-dependent rules and added to the agent’s mod-
ule for event interpretation. This module employs key-
word spotting in a context-sensitive way to evaluate the
language input and then sends a positive or negative im-
pulse to Max’s emotion system. Regarding the nature of
this interaction scenario, where Max is supposed to pro-
vide the visitor with presumably new information, it was
not necessary to implement a heuristics to determine the
possible dynamics of the “dominance” relationship be-
tween the interlocutors. The agent is thus always feeling
dominant in this scenario. As one consequence he gets
angry instead of fearful when being insulted, as in the
emotion system anger and fear are only distinguished by
their respective Dominance values (cf. Figure 1).
In the cards game scenario the cognitive appraisal is
likewise driven directly by the situational context. Ev-
ery move of the human player leads to a negative im-
pulse sent to the agent’s emotion system, as it is con-
trary to the agent’s overall goal of winning the game.
When Max can play a card himself, however, a positive
impulse is sent to the emotion system. The intensities
of the impulses are dependent on the importance of the
move in the overall situation, of which we distinguished
negative empathic and positive empathic. In the negative
empathic condition the moves of the human player are
appraised as very negative, e.g. causing an emotional
impulse of -25, whereas in the positive empathic condi-
tion the same event is appraised only slightly negative.
Furthermore, adequate empathic behaviors are triggered
to let the agent react to a change of the human player’s
emotional state. Just by shifting the intensities of the
impulses and supportingly triggering adequate empathic
behaviors, we could show that the agent’s emotional be-
havior is changed significantly enough to create the im-
pression of negative or positive empathy (see [4]).
Domain-independent Emotion Simulation
Building upon the experiences with domain-dependent
appraisal, we wanted to further the architecture towards
a more general interplay of cognition and emotion. Our
goal was to model the mechanisms that cause an agent
to experience emotions in the context of his reasoning
processes, independently of the particular scenario.
Oatley and Johnson-Laird [14] present an approach in
which the evocation of emotions stands in a close rela-
tionship with general plan success and failure. They pro-
pose the following elicitors: subgoals being achieved, fail-
ure of major plan or loss of active goal, threatened self-
preservation goals, active plan frustrated (e.g. blocked),
and gustatory goal violated; leading to the emotions of
happiness, sadness, anxiety, anger, and disgust, respec-
tively. In addition, Bechara et al. [2] argue for emotions
being evoked directly at deliberation time from the de-
cision process itself. They state that somatic markers
occur as values assessing the emotional quality of out-
comes of possible actions. These markers constrain the
decision-making space, making it manageable for logics-
based and cost-benefit analysis.
To model these mechanisms of emotion evocation, sev-
eral requirements must be met. Gratch and Marsella [7]
point out that in order to enable an agent to experience
emotions, amongst other requirements, an explicit rep-
resentation of intermediate knowledge states is needed
for further inferences and appraisal. For example, to
reason about the desirability of states and courses of
action, the agent must represent preferences over out-
comes. We thus extended Max’s cognitive architecture
in several ways.
The representation of preferences over outcomes en-
ables the agent to reason about which plan to commit to.
A desired state of the world is characterized by the num-
ber of satisfied and unsatisfied goals and their priorities,
respectively. To decide which plan to pursue, the agent
not only needs to take the preferred state into account,
but also the means to achieve it. We therefore extended
the plan representation to account for resources required
for the execution of the plan and the effort it takes to
carry it out. Resources cover both objects in the world
as well as e.g. certain body parts of the agent. The ef-
fort values are determined either by assuming a default
value for the plan’s average effort, or by calculating a
context-specific sum of the estimated effort values of its
subgoals. This calculation can further be broken down
to simple plans that directly trigger behaviors and mo-
tor programs, i.e. are rooted in the agent’s physis and
situational context.
With the extended architecture, we can introduce
mechanisms for the automatic triggering of emotional
impulses. As proposed by Oatley and Johnson-Laird
[14], we concentrate on significant junctures of plans: a
positive impulse is sent to the emotion module in cases
of goal/subgoal achievement, and a negative impulse is
used in case of goal failure. The strength of the impulse is
deduced from the goal’s priority value. Beyond these di-
rect consequences of goal achievement/failure, emotions
arise in a close relationship to the expectations connected
to a plan. Expectations can occur toward the interac-
tion partner, e.g., in the assembly scenario, Max expects
his interlocutor to react to a request by either signal-
ing refusal or by carrying out the action asked for. If
the interlocutor does not respond at all, Max will try to
encourage her. Failing this goal, and thus experiencing
negative impulses, he gets in a bad mood. On a lower
level, the agent’s beliefs about his own capabilities serve
as a source of expectations. For example, to account for
the frustration of a plan, we can build on the expected
effort values of plans (see above). These effort expec-
tations are calculated at the time the agent commits to
a plan. In regular intervals, they are updated and com-
pared with the actually investigated effort. If a plan gets
more effortful than expected, negative impulses will be
deposited to the emotion system. By this means, the
agent recognizes not only cases of plan failure but also
currently ineffective plans.
How Emotions Influence Cognition
In the previous sections we have concentrated on how
emotions arise in the context of cognitive processes. Now
we turn to the opposite phenomena and discuss which
impact emotions can have on cognition. That is, we are
getting at a closed-loop interaction between cognition
and emotion, in which the current emotional state is
even able to influence the basic cognitive mechanisms.
As Marsella and Gratch [12] point out, ”by provid-
ing an explicit and rich reasoning infrastructure, plan-
based approaches facilitate models of how emotions im-
pact decision-making. Emotional state can act as search
control, focusing cognitive resources on specific goals or
threads. It can also alter the overall character of prob-
lem solving.” Another view is advocated by Oatley and
Johnson-Laird [14], according to which emotions act as
a specific system of internal communication to coordi-
nate multiple plans and goals under the constraints of
time and limited resources. For example, emotions can
change the relative priorities of goals in a parallel system
of planning, thus serving as an indicator for the evolving
success of plans and the overall performance of the agent.
We differentiate here between these two basic roles that
emotions can play as beliefs and modulators.
Emotions as Beliefs
The straight-forward way to model the influence of emo-
tions on cognition is to incorporate them as variables in
the deliberative processes. To this end, in Max’s archi-
tecture, the actual emotion category as well as the mood
value, incessantly provided by the emotion system, are
asserted as beliefs on the cognitive layer of the agent.
That is, the agent becomes cognitively ”aware” of every
emotional state of himself that is decisive enough to be
classified in terms of his emotional categories. These be-
liefs influence the agent’s goal and plan selection process
on a symbolic level. On the one hand, these beliefs can
rule out plans when formulated as part of a plan’s pre-
conditions. On the other hand, emotions can that way
directly trigger behaviors, thus evoking a mechanism to
to cope with the emotional state or the situation in which
it arose. For example, getting to know about his own
bad mood allows the agent to invoke certain behaviors,
or possibly raise certain goals, he would not invoke in a
different, more relaxed emotional condition.
In the museum setting, for instance, this mechanism
is utilized to allow the agent to de-escalate rude vis-
itor behavior: repeated insults by visitors will incre-
mentally put his emotional system in a bad mood (via
domain-dependent appraisal), which will eventually lead
to anger of an increasing intensity. When first becom-
ing ”angry” the agent says warningly ”Now I’m getting
angry”, accompanied by physical indicators like a low
pitch and rate of his voice as well as by the facial expres-
sion of angriness. Further negative impulses result in a
more intense anger. Cognitively ”realizing” this state,
the agent’s deliberation decides – again in a domain-
dependent manner – to cope with this emotional state
by leaving the scene, and staying away until the state
has returned to a normal, balanced level. The period of
absence can either be shortened by complimenting Max
or extended by insulting him again.
Such behavior strategies for coping with strong feel-
ings were defined beforehand and added to the plan li-
brary of the agent. However, they are of special impor-
tance for the agent, and they are invoked in any context
as soon as a decisively strong feeling arises. To this end,
specific reactive plans are incorporated in the agent’s de-
liberative module, watching out for certain relations de-
scribing the agent’s emotion category. If the emotion
exceeds a specified threshold, the plan fires with a high
priority, leading to the instantiation of a goal to cope
with the emotion.
Emotions as Modulators
The second important way of how emotions can influ-
ence cognitive processes is by modulating their basic
functioning. That is, the strategies of planning and
decision-making themselves can be affected by the cur-
rent emotional state. For example, negative affect can
bias problem-solving strategies in humans towards local,
bottom-up processing, whereas positive affect can lead
to global, top-down approaches.
To pinpoint where emotions can take effect in the cog-
nitive processing, the BDI-interpreter algorithm [18] is
presented in Algorithm 1. In Max’s architecture emo-
tions can modulate the interpreter’s processes at the fol-
lowing points. In line 4, where possible options of future
action are generated, emotions can directly restrict this
collecting, such that only those actions are taken into
account which fit with the agent’s emotional state. E.g.
if the agent is angry, he won’t ask his interaction part-
ner for help. Additionally, the process which calculates
the utility values of plans can be either coarse and opti-
mistic (e.g. with respect to the expected effort) in case of
a positive emotional state, or more exact and pessimistic
when the agent is in a negative emotional state.
Algorithm 1 BDI-interpreter [18]
1: procedure think
2: initialize-state()
3: loop
4: options← option-generator(event-queue)
5: selected options← deliberate(options)
6: update-intentions(selected-options)
7: execute()
8: get-new-external-events()
9: drop-successful-attitudes()
10: drop-impossible-attitudes()
11: end loop
12: end procedure
In line 5, the choice which option to adopt as next
intention can be influenced by the emotional state of
the agent, too. When pursuing multiple goals simulta-
neously, the agent can reason about negative interac-
tions between them, such as resource conflicts or one
plan’s effect prohibiting another plan’s execution. Like-
wise, positive interactions such as the fulfillment of two
goals by executing only one plan, or the performance of
one plan making another plan applicable can be taken
into account. But, as these processes tend to be time-
consuming, the agent should not apply them in arbitrary
depth and should not always consider them. We hence
propose to let the application of these mechanisms in
line 5 depend on the agent’s emotional state: negative
emotions seem to lead to a narrowed problem-solving,
while positive emotions lead to broader problem-solving
attempts to achieve multiple goals simultaneously [21].
We can model this effect by investigating the extra ef-
fort of considering positive interactions between goals
and plans only when the agent is in a positive emotional
state. If in a bad mood, the agent will then not consider
positive interactions but would narrowly focus on his
most important goal, becoming more “narrow-minded”.
In line 10 of the agorithm, the process of dropping
impossible goals can be extended to account for plans
that perform badly. This decision process, whether to
abandon the plan and on which level, can thereby be
influenced by the emotional state. If the agent is in a
negative emotional state, he will abandon the complete
plan and try to re-plan again, otherwise if in a good
mood, the agent can be more patient and retry to achieve
the subgoal.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented ongoing work on the
mutual interaction between emotion and cognition in
the architecture of our embodied agent Max. Based
on our experiences with domain-specific emotion evo-
cation, we have presented approaches toward a higher-
level, domain-independent connection of the separate
modules for emotion simulation and deliberative reason-
ing. Along these lines, one particularly promising ap-
proach is to ground the appraisal processes of the embod-
ied agent on his physis, based on the concept of effort.
One issue for our future work will thus be to generally ex-
tend motor behaviors to an estimation of their expected
effort, taking account of the forces and energy needed
to move the body in the appropriate way. In addition,
the modeling of how the emotion dynamics can influ-
ence and fine-tune decision-making beyond the inclusion
of feelings as self-realized facts, is still in its beginning.
We have proposed how a classical BDI-interpreter can
be extended to simulate how cognitive processing itself
can be influenced by the emotional state of the agent,
notably, during the creation and selection of options, as
well as the dropping of unsuccesful plans. While cer-
tainly to be proven empirically, we believe that the pro-
posed steps toward modeling the interaction of emotion
and cognition will yield to a more consistent and believ-
able behavior of embodied agents.
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